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Islamic Economics Institute
Document Details
Document Type
:
Article In Journal
Document Title
:
Income Ratio, Risk-Sharing, and the Optimality of Mudarabah
نسبة الدخل، والاشتراك في الخطر وأمثلية المضاربة
Subject
:
Income Ratio, Risk-Sharing
Document Language
:
English
Abstract
:
Little attention in the current literature is given to the analysis of interest-free Islamic financing tools within the framework of risk-return portfolio analysis. This paper adopts the standard tools to establish interesting optimal properties of mudarabah within a two-party contractual model of an income generating economic activity. ‘Income ratio’ is defined as the percentage of expected income that goes to each of the two parties whereas the ‘risk-sharing structure’ refers to how risk is shared between the two parties. The key question is how these two parameters are related through alternative two-party contracts. This paper is an extension to another one where the risk-sharing structure is shown to be perfectly proportionate to income ratio in the case of mudarabah. The Shariah-prohibited interest-rate financing is a manifest disproportionate case as the income ratio of lender is totally insensitive to the contract’s risk. Adopting the same competitive set-up within an informational efficient environment, this paper sets out to establish two more findings: First, a negative relationship proves to exist between income ratio and the risk-sharing structure in terms of an optimal contracts curve (OCC). The mudarabah contract emerges at an optimal break-even point where the OCC coincides with pure profit-sharing but fixed return financial leverages also co-exist with mudarabah. Hence, a pure equity-based Islamic order is theoretically inconceivable even under ideal information efficiency. Second, the optimal mudarabah income ratio (i.e. profit-sharing ratio) is shown to depend crucially on the extent to which the two parties differ in their attitude towards risk (i.e. the risk-attitude differential). The paper goes further to examine the impact of risk-attitudinal differentials on the optimal profit-sharing ratio. These findings are shown to have useful practical and policy implications.
ISSN
:
1018-7383
Journal Name
:
Islamic Economics Journal
Volume
:
21
Issue Number
:
2
Publishing Year
:
1429 AH
2008 AD
Article Type
:
Article
Added Date
:
Saturday, July 3, 2010
Researchers
Researcher Name (Arabic)
Researcher Name (English)
Researcher Type
Dr Grade
Email
سيف الدين تاج الدين
Tag El-Din, Saif
Researcher
Doctorate
Files
File Name
Type
Description
27300.pdf
pdf
Income Ratio, Risk-Sharing, and the Optimality of Mudarabah
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